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Abstract
This paper presents an account of the senses and what differentiates them that is compatible with
richly multisensory perception and consciousness. According to this proposal, senses are ways of
perceiving. Each sense is a subfaculty that comprises a collection of perceptual capacities. What each
sense shares and what differentiates one sense from another is the manner in which those capacities
are exercised. Each way of perceiving involves a distinct type of information gathering, individuated
by the information it functions to extract and the medium from which it does so. This approach dis-
tinguishes the project of characterizing and differentiating senses from that of attributing experiences
to sensory modalities. Perceptual experiences are episodes in which perceptual capacities are exer-
cised. Conscious perceptual episodes may be ascribed to distinct sensory modalities, according to
the manners in which perceptual capacities are deployed on an occasion. According to this account,
senses are not exclusive. First, their capacities may overlap. Second, perceptual episodes, including
conscious experiences, may belong to multiple senses. Indeed, some episodes require the joint use of
several senses. In this account, subjects have only limited first-person knowledge of the senses they
employ.
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1. Skepticism about the Senses
Common sense and theorizing about perception and the mind presuppose that
humans possess multiple senses. Typically, we include vision, audition, touch,
taste, and smell. Some count more or fewer senses. Taste and smell might
collapse into one chemical sense; touch may fragment into thermoreception
and mechanoreception. Moreover, we may possess senses beyond the familiar
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ones. Interoception also offers to multiply our inventory of senses. Nonethe-
less, among the familiar exteroceptive modalities of sensory perception, by
means of which we become perceptually aware of things and features in the
world independent from ourselves and our own experiences, received wisdom
counts several distinct senses.
There are differences in focus. Psychologists and neuroscientists investigate
sensory systems, processes, and performance. Philosophers theorize about
sensory consciousness and experience. Non-specialists exploit senses as ways
of finding out, getting around, and having a good time. But our having sev-
eral senses is as close to a shared assumption as one finds in these areas. It
structures folk, scientific, and philosophical approaches to the mind.
The shared view faces two substantial challenges. The first is that multisen-
sory perception and consciousness challenge the independence of our senses.
Recent work in psychophysics and neuroscience demonstrates that sensory
systems interact extensively. This can cause surprising crossmodal perceptual
illusions, such as ventriloquism, the McGurk effect, and the sound-induced
flash. Such interactions are not merely causal or accidental. Conflict resolu-
tion and weighted recalibration sometimes cause illusions, but generally they
enhance the coherence and the overall reliability of sense perception. Coor-
dination among senses is part of perceptual functioning. Moreover, the joint
use of the senses can extend their reach to reveal novel perceptible features,
including intermodal identity, causality, and even qualities such as flavor. One
upshot is that characteristics typically associated with one sense can rely on
the influence of other senses, at a time or over time. Another is that features
of a perceptual episode can outstrip those associated with each of the various
senses. In these respects, even perceptual consciousness is richly — consti-
tutively and irreducibly — multisensory. As a consequence, the boundaries
between senses are not easily discerned.
Multisensory perception also has been used to challenge the distinctness
of our senses. Sensory scientists, such as Shimojo and Shams (2001), argue
that multisensory interactions, integration, and plasticity over time show that
senses are not distinct modalities, understood as discrete information process-
ing systems (see Note 1). In philosophy, Speaks (2015, ch. 25) contends that
multisensory consciousness challenges the claim that the senses are distinct
experiential modalities, understood as phenomenal ways of being related to
contents, akin to distinct attitudes. Tye (2003, p. 28) says distinct, phenomeno-
logically bounded, sense-specific components of overall perceptual experience
are ‘figments of philosophers’ and psychologists’ imaginations’. O’Callaghan
(2012, pp. 111–112) suggests that multisensory perception and consciousness
make trouble for extant accounts of sense individuation. And the popular press
is teeming with reports that multisensory phenomena — including synesthe-
sia, taste–smell interactions in gastronomy, sensory prostheses, augmentation,
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and substitution — overturn traditional ideas about where one sense ends and
another begins. Multisensory phenomena threaten the natural idea that we pos-
sess distinct senses.
There is a further complication. We lack a satisfactory account of what in-
dividuates senses. What makes something a sense? What differentiates one
sense from another? In virtue of what do experiences belong to sensory modal-
ities? The problem is not a shortage of candidates. Grice (1962) influentially
distinguishes four types of criteria. These appeal, respectively, to the features
perceived; to the physical medium or energy stimulating our sense organs;
to internal processes and mechanisms; or to special ntrospectable character.
However, Grice articulates serious obstacles for each, tentatively settling on a
hybrid (Note 2). Nudds (2003) in turn spells out destructive objections to each
specific criterion. Grice’s hybrid does not escape. Despite numerous attempts,
no consensus yet has been reached concerning how to differentiate senses, nor
is any candidate a favorite. This means we cannot rely on accepted criteria
to address the first challenge. And it compounds skeptical worries raised by
multisensory perception and consciousness (Note 3).
One response is despair. Nudds (2003) denies that senses are real psycho-
logical kinds that earn a place in mature theorizing. He says how we carve
up senses is a matter of convention, an entrenched shared habit. If so, sensory
taxonomy is answerable ultimately to pragmatic considerations. Speaks (2015,
p. 173) echoes this.
Another response is pluralism. Some are pluralists about the types of senses
that exist. Macpherson (2011), for instance, holds that each criterion proposed
to individuate senses corresponds to a dimension in a complex multidimen-
sional space into which fits each of many, many actual and possible senses.
Distinct locations yield distinct senses. Others are pluralists about classifica-
tory criteria. Fulkerson (2014a) maintains that complex, overlapping sensory
systems may be differentiated in differing ways depending on one’s explana-
tory purposes. In principle, one might appeal to receptors, to functions, or to
experiences. Each is legitimate, carving senses differently depending on one’s
aims in a context. Matthen (2015) is a pluralist about concepts of senses. Sen-
sory scientists and laypeople do not disagree about the nature of the senses.
Instead, they employ distinct concepts, so their subject matter differs.
I am an optimist. Optimists hold out for a principled, informative account
of the nature of the senses and of what differentiates them. The account I
pursue here is designed to be compatible with richly multisensory perception
and consciousness. It trades on the insights of conventionalists and plural-
ists. However, unlike conventionalists, it treats senses as psychologically real.
And, unlike pluralists, it does not multiply senses, classification schemes, or
concepts of senses.
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What follows is an account of the nature of the senses and of what dif-
ferentiates them. Section 2 presents what I call the capacities account of the
senses. Sections 3–5 describe what individuates distinct senses, including dis-
tinct token, determinate, and determinable senses. Section 6 confronts hard
cases, including touch, flavor, and sensory substitution. Section 7 applies the
account to multisensory perception, and Section 8 addresses how to attribute
episodes and experiences to sense modalities. Section 9 describes how this
account captures the significance of the senses. Section 10 concludes.
2. The Capacities Account
Begin by distinguishing the project of characterizing and differentiating senses
from that of ascribing experiences to sensory modalities. Considerations ap-
posite one task do not always matter to the other. This paper first tackles
characterizing and individuating senses, then turns to attributing experiences
to sensory modalities.
The account of the senses I favor takes its lead from two insights. The first
is due to Nudds (2003, p. 47, see also pp. 44–49), who puts it plainly: “Senses
are ways of perceiving”. The other is due to Matthen (2015, p. 567), who says,
“The senses constitute a group of information-gathering faculties”. Putting
them together, the senses comprise differing ways of gathering information.
Suppose that perception is or involves a type of psychological faculty. It
is useful to understand a faculty as a collection of capacities. A sense is a
modality of perception. So, a sense is a family of perceptual capacities. This
is the core of the capacities account of the senses.
A capacity is akin to an ability, a capability, or a power. The important
thing about capacities is that they are distinct from their exercises. Capaci-
ties are standing characteristics whose possession is a matter of potential or
disposition, rather than current or actual activity. Exercises of capacities are
occurrences or performances. They are episodes or events. So, for instance,
you may have the capacity to pronounce the longest word of the English
language, even though you are not now uttering it, and even if you never en-
counter it. You have the capacity to hold your breath, even if you are breathing
and never intend to stop. Capacity ascriptions thus are counterfactually sen-
sitive. They concern what one could or would do under various conditions,
whether or not those conditions obtain. Exercises of capacities are occasions
in which a capacity is manifested or demonstrated. One task of empirical psy-
chology is to test relevant subjunctives.
My discussion focuses on capacities a subject currently possesses, rather
than ones a subject could come to possess in time with development or effort.
This corresponds to Aristotle’s distinction in De Anima between first actual-
ity (capacity) and potentiality (Barnes, 1984). Exercises or manifestations of
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such capacities correspond to Aristotle’s second actuality. My account also re-
lies on joining Aristotle’s rejection in Metaphysics of the Megarian view that
possessing a capacity requires its current exercise.
Perceptual capacities are psychological features of subjects. In the first in-
stance, they are capacities to perceive things and features. For example, typical
human beings have the capacity to perceive sounds and their pitch, timbre,
and loudness when awake and in the presence of compression waves between
20 Hz and 20 kHz. A further inventory of what is perceptible might include
ordinary objects, colors, shapes, rainbows, chords, speech, flavors, textures,
faces, collisions, and causality. Some lists are more liberal, and some are more
austere.
Perceiving requires being differentially sensitive to the presence of things
or features in one’s environment (Lewis, 1980). Differential sensitivity to a
thing or feature requires the capacity to detect it or to register its presence.
Responding to its presence is not enough, however, since one might respond
to a range of distinct things in just the same way. For differential sensitivity,
one needs to respond differently to a thing or feature from how one would
respond to at least some others. For example, being differentially sensitive to
an extended object requires distinguishing it from its surroundings and from
other objects. To be differentially sensitive to a feature such as pitch requires
responding differently to pitches from how one responds to other features,
such as hues or sourness. Differential sensitivity to C! precludes responding
uniformly to it and other features, including distinct determinate pitches.
Differential sensitivity is not enough to possess a perceptual capacity. The
responsiveness of a low-level receptor or a feature-sensitive neuron does not
suffice. Perceptual capacities must play the right role in a subject’s psychol-
ogy. A subject’s thinking and acting must reflect differential sensitivity in the
way that is characteristic of perception. For example, detecting and differenti-
ating should enable making use of a target in attention, recognition, judgment,
belief, memory, or imagination.
A capacity is individuated by what it is a capacity for, or to do; that is, by
the circumstance that is the outcome of its successful exercise. The capacity
to tie a shoelace is distinct from the capacity to fasten a button because the
conditions for their successful exercises differ (even while they involve shared
cognitive and manual capacities). Accordingly, we may individuate perceptual
capacities in part according to their objects (see, for instance, Schellenberg,
2018, ch. 2). Perceptual capacities differ when they target distinct objects or
features. A difference in what two subjects can detect and differentiate, when
it plays the right psychological role, means a difference in their perceptual
capacities (Note 4).
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Questions about what can be perceived are questions about what can be
detected and what can be differentiated. Such capacities, which ground or con-
stitute a capacity to perceive, count among perceptual capacities.
What use are perceptual capacities in theorizing? Aristotle said capacities
are principles of change that explain activities. Capacities are powerful pre-
dictive and explanatory tools. This is true in science, in philosophy, and in
day-to-day coping. Psychologists catalog capacities in order to describe, pre-
dict, and explain performance. Philosophers appeal to capacities in normative
assessments. We all make use of capacities in planning and in deciding to hold
ourselves and others accountable.
Appealing to a capacity to make a prediction requires specifying what is
done when it is manifested. This means saying what is accomplished. What is
the outcome of the capacity’s successful exercise? More specific predictions
require saying in what conditions the capacity is exercised. What are the cir-
cumstances that prompt or allow the relevant disposition to be realized? For
example, you have the capacity to understand the last word of this paper. In
particular, you have the capacity to do so when awake, attentive, and presented
with it in good light or quiet. Ascribing this capacity enables me to predict
how things will be if you reach that word. You will grasp its content. You will
comprehend it.
Notice that this does not explain much. It does rule out that the outcome was
an accident. But, like dispositions, capacities and the conditions in which they
are exercised add little in accounting for and illuminating why an outcome
occurs or an accomplishment takes place. This is not the case if capacities
themselves are inherently powerful features (Heil, 2012), but it is best not to
tie an account of the senses to a specific metaphysics of properties.
Explanation requires more. It requires saying how things are done. This
means specifying the manner in which a capacity is exercised. How is the
performance carried out? Doing so does help to explain an outcome or an
accomplishment. Consider again the case of word understanding. You can un-
derstand this paper’s last word. You might do so by reading it on the page. Or,
you might do so by hearing me speak it aloud. You might encounter the Braille
inscription, or you might see the American Sign Language gestures. Each in-
volves a distinct way to exercise the capacity for understanding. Describing
the manner in which you exercise the capacity for understanding helps to ac-
count for why you grasp the meaning when you do. Cummins (1983), who
treats capacities as disposition types, says psychological explanations work by
analyzing capacities into their subcapacities. Describing subcapacities helps
explain performance. Doing so is one way to specify the way or manner in
which a capacity is exercised (Note 5).
My proposal is that each sense is a collection of perceptual capacities. What
each sense shares and what differs between senses is the manner in which
Multisensory Research (2020) DOI:10.1163/22134808-bja10024 7
perceptual capacities are exercised. Each sense is a bundle of perceptual ca-
pacities exercised in a distinctive manner.
3. Ways of Perceiving
Senses are families of perceptual capacities. Each sense is unified and dis-
tinguished by the way or manner in which those capacities are exercised or
demonstrated. This calls for an account of sensory manners. What follows de-
velops one such proposal.
Sensory manners must individuate senses at the right grain. The aim is to
offer an account that captures two facts about sense perception. First, it is pos-
sible to deploy the same perceptual capacity in distinct manners. For instance,
one can perceive shapes by vision or by touch. Second, it is possible to deploy
distinct capacities in the same manner. One can perceive shapes and colors in
vision, pitches and loudness in hearing, or texture and warmth in touch.
To individuate senses, Matthen (2015) appeals to the actions or exploratory
activities involved in perceiving. These include opening and aiming one’s eyes
in looking; gripping and guiding one’s hands in feeling a surface; sniffing
around to get a whiff; orienting one’s head to optimize spatial hearing; or
savoring by chewing and swishing. O’Regan and Noë (2001) pursue a related
approach. Each invokes activity types to differentiate the senses.
Differing exploratory activities do bring to light differing manners in
which perceptual capacities are exercised. However, the class of information-
gathering activities is vast and diverse. It lacks neat structure, and its joints are
not clearly marked. Exploratory activities alone are too amorphous to deliver
an account of sensory manners. We need to say more.
Perceiving is enabled by extracting information contained in a stimulus.
Human beings extract information from various physical sources in part by
means of receptors that respond selectively to each. These tuned receptors
are distributed around our bodies, collected in our sense organs. We exercise
perceptual capacities by doing things that enable us to detect and differentiate
objects and features through the use of our sense organs. When we exercise
perceptual capacities, we do so by behaving so as to facilitate information
gathering. We explore, and we glean details about our surroundings.
Sense perception thus involves using a sense organ in order to detect and
differentiate things and features in the environment, thereby exploiting or tak-
ing advantage of its capacity to transduce and thus to help extract information
contained in a medium or proximal stimulus. This is a way of gathering infor-
mation. Call it sensory information gathering. Sensory information gathering
is a kind of information-gathering activity. On a given occasion, sensory infor-
mation gathering comprises a process by means of which perceptual capacities
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are exercised. The details of this process determine a very specific way or man-
ner of exercising a perceptual capacity.
Sensory information gathering reveals what is distinctive about exercising
perceptual capacities using the senses. However, the ways of exercising per-
ceptual capacities it illuminates involve very specific processes. So, it does not
yet individuate senses at the appropriate grain. That requires types of sensory
information gathering.
What marks the types of sensory information gathering that individuate
senses? Sensory information gathering activities have numerous features in
virtue of which they belong to a variety of distinct types. For instance, each
involves a sense organ, a kind of energy transduced, information extracted,
things and features thereby discerned, and gross body movements. Specifying
these types is an empirical task, subject to philosophical interrogation.
To make progress, suppose we understand a sense organ as a collection of
receptor types. If so, a sense organ is a device that transduces energy of a spe-
cific sort. Unlike a biological organ, this does not require a cellular makeup or
evolutionary history, so it allows for prosthetic sense organs (cf. Keeley, 2002).
Even so, it is best not to tie senses to specific sense organs, in light of sensory
substitution (see Section 6). However, classifying information-gathering ac-
tivities according to the sense organs they deploy helps show the way to what
unifies and differentiates senses.
Sense organs carve sensory information-gathering activities at a relatively
natural joint. Each sense organ transduces energy of a specific kind. This en-
ables a perceiver to extract information about whatever range of distal features
that medium contains. The use of a given sense organ even exhibits charac-
teristic patterns of bodily movement, revealing shared forms of action and
reaction, both simple and complex, that facilitate selectively extracting spe-
cific kinds of information from the medium.
These features do not go together accidentally. They point to a joint func-
tion. The activity they characterize serves to extract, from a given medium of
transmission or stimulating energy, information of a specific sort. That is the
role the activity plays. That is its purpose. We may call this its information ex-
traction function. My claim is that this function individuates the relevant types
of information gathering. Thus, it individuates sensory manners.
The proposal is that each sensory modality is a family of perceptual capac-
ities. In particular, each is a collection of capacities exercised in a common
manner. Sensory manners are aspects of exercises of perceptual capacities.
According to the account I have described, sensory manners are types of in-
formation gathering. So, each capacity belonging to a sensory modality can be
exercised by means of the same type of information-gathering activity. What
marks the relevant type of activity or process is its information extraction func-
tion, which is given by the variety of information it functions to extract and
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the medium from which it does so. Therefore, a sense is a bundle of perceptual
capacities whose exercise involves a common sort of information gathering,
individuated by the information it serves to extract from a particular medium.
4. Information Extraction Functions
Several features of this framework are noteworthy. The foundation is that the
medium and the information it encodes are independent from perceivers and
their distinctive concerns. Perceivers’ activities function selectively to extract
such information, as shaped by their interests and means.
First, the medium is a kind of external stimulus that triggers peripheral
sense receptors. Each type of medium is a natural kind, characterized by its
respective physical science. Light is electromagnetic radiation in a given spec-
trum. Sound is a compression wave that propagates in a material such as air
or water. Molecules are chemical kinds. Pressure is mechanical force. Tem-
perature is molecular kinetic energy. Magnetism is a polarized field of current
loops.
Second, a medium bears and transmits information. Information is reduced
uncertainty, or increased likelihood (Shannon, 1948). A medium encodes in-
formation concerning things and features beyond sense receptors, outside the
bodies of organisms. Light encodes information about illumination sources
and reflectance properties of surfaces. Sound waves contain information about
the intensity, periodicity, and durations of disturbances. Chemicals bear in-
formation about volatility, decay, poisonousness, and nutritiousness of things
we sniff and ingest. Mechanical forces convey resistance, solidity, texture, and
shape.
Third, its physical characteristics determine which information a medium
does and does not encode. In a vacuum or in air, light transmits information
about illumination sources because it travels mostly undisrupted. It carries in-
formation about surface reflectance because objects selectively filter differing
wavelengths. It conveys rich detail about boundaries because its wavelength
is tiny relative to macroscopic objects. It reveals motion at a distance because
it travels quickly. Sound waves convey little about precise spatial boundaries
due to their long wavelength in relation to ordinary object sizes — centimeters
to tens of meters in the human audible range. They give no indication of il-
lumination, and not much about rotting or decomposing. Chemicals in air are
too slow to reveal motion at a distance. The medium thus constrains which
information it encodes and transmits.
Fourth, information extraction is selective. Not all information encoded in
a medium is extracted by perceivers. Some is no use, and some we lack tools
to access. For instance, converting a stimulus to neural activity fails to record
each physical property that encodes information. Transducing a signal thus
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filters it. The process is ‘lossy’. Downstream processes are a further filter.
Sensory and perceptual subcapacities discern, decode, and thereby extract in-
formation from what is transduced. Sensory processes select what is needed
to detect and differentiate features of use, discarding the rest. So, on any occa-
sion, the information extracted from a medium is a portion of what it encodes
and transmits.
Fifth, information extraction can be modeled as a relation between a
medium and the information extracted from it. This yields a function from
each type of medium and the information it encodes to what can be extracted
from it by a type of perceiver. The medium type determines which information
it encodes in an environment, and the information extracted is a selection from
that.
Sixth, sensory information gathering has an information extraction func-
tion when it functions to extract information from a medium. Its information
extraction function is characterized by the type of information it serves to ex-
tract and the medium from which it does so. Two broad notions of function
are relevant, and the account is neutral between them. According to one, to
have a function is to play a role in a system. For instance, a watch mainspring
drives the barrel and powers the movement. According to the other, to have a
function is to have a purpose or a goal. For instance, a watch tells time. So,
to perform a function is to play a role or to serve an aim. Thus, for a type of
activity or process to have a given information extraction function is for it to
play the role or to serve the aim of extracting from a certain medium informa-
tion of a given sort. By design, in this account, activities and processes that
constitute sensory information gathering play the role and serve the aim of ex-
tracting information from a medium, in the context of enabling the exercise of
perceptual capacities.
Seventh, specific activities and processes that belong to such a type must
serve to extract a common variety of information from the same medium. We
have seen that the physical characteristics of a medium jointly encode infor-
mation about a range of features. Transduction yields neural activity that also
jointly encodes some of that information. Activities and processes that enable
gathering information about a given feature from a certain medium therefore
cannot help but enable gathering information about other such features. For in-
stance, extracting information about reflectances requires an activity that also
enables extracting information about edges, boundaries, and motion. Gather-
ing information about pitch means gathering information about intensity. That
information is entangled during encoding and transduction. Garg et al. (2019)
report that even single neurons in the primate primary visual cortex (V1) code
for both color and orientation.
Finally, attributing an information extraction function requires empirical
work. Which information a type of activity or process serves to extract from
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a medium mostly is a question for the perception sciences. Detailed accounts
describe the distal sources, local cues, and means by which information is
extracted. Nonetheless, it is an empirically necessary condition on being dif-
ferentially sensitive to the presence of things and features in one’s environment
that it is possible to extract information about them that is contained in a
medium or stimulus. So, evidence for capacities to detect and differentiate
is evidence for information extraction.
5. How Many Senses?
Questions about numbers of senses turn on questions about perceptual capac-
ities and the manners in which they are exercised. In considering cases, one
first needs to be clear what is being counted.
A token sense, such as my particular sense of vision, as distinct from yours,
is a bundle of perceptual capacities instantiated by a perceiver (Note 6). Its
possessor can exercise each such capacity in a common way or manner —
that is, by means of an activity or process involving the same kind of sensory
information gathering. Since it is individuated by its information extraction
function, each such activity type serves to extract from a specific medium a
particular variety of information.
A determinate sense, such as human vision, as distinct from bonobo vision,
is a determinate collection of perceptual capacities. It may characterize a range
of perceivers. Senses can be understood as more or less determinate. Human
vision and bonobo vision are more determinate senses than primate vision.
Human vision just like mine is still more determinate. Capacities that consti-
tute a single determinate sense share a sensory manner. Each can be exercised
by means of a type of information-gathering activity that functions to extract a
specific range of information from a medium. How the medium encodes infor-
mation and how receptors transduce it constrain which information an activity
can function to extract. Equipment, needs, skills, and interests shape the rest.
A determinable sense, such as vision, whether human or honeybee, encom-
passes a range of determinate senses that involve a common type of way of
perceiving. A determinable type of sense modality is marked by information-
gathering activities that serve to extract information from among what is en-
coded in a particular medium. The most determinable type of sensory modality
still recognizable as such is just all those senses that serve to extract informa-
tion encoded in the same kind of medium.
6. Hard Cases
This approach to characterizing and differentiating sense modalities illumi-
nates disputes about difficult cases. In hard cases, it is unclear to which sensory
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modality certain capacities belong. According to the capacities account, dis-
agreement turns on predictable differences in how to specify ways or manners
of perceiving. However, the account sketched here offers tools and guidance
to make progress with tough cases. What follows samples how the account
handles key hard cases.
6.1. Grice’s Four-Eyed Creature
Grice asks if a creature with two pairs of eyes would have two senses of vision
or two distinct kinds of sense modality. Grice says the verdict depends on what
it is like to perceive using each set of eyes. If the creatures reported, “there’s all
the difference in the world”, between perceiving with one set and perceiving
with the other, we should be prepared to say they possess two kinds of sense
rather than one (Grice, 1962, p. 146).
The interesting question about Grice’s creatures is not whether they have
one sense of vision and some other kind of sense. It is whether their two token
senses are one or two determinates of the determinable sense, vision.
Start with the prior question. Why does the creature instantiate two bun-
dles of vision-like capacities rather than just one? This question is especially
pressing if the capacities are exercised in the same way or manner.
First, suppose Grice’s creatures are differentially sensitive to just the same
things and features using each set of eyes, as Grice suggests — he says they
perceive blue and round with each. And suppose they use each set in the same
way to enable this. If so, the capacities exercised using each set of eyes match.
What makes this two sets of capacities rather than one?
Suppose each set of eyes is controlled separately from the other set, and that
each set can target different parts of the surroundings. And suppose that, while
information from each eye in a pair is integrated to ground unified awareness,
as in, say, stereopsis or binocular fusion, information is not integrated in that
way between the two pairs.
If so, my view entails that the creatures possess two token visual senses
of the same determinate type, while typical humans possess one token. The
bundle of capacities is instantiated twice: any single capacity can have distinct
independent exercises; capacities from distinct instances do not depend on
each other like capacities from the same bundle instance; and some key capac-
ities otherwise are missing from the union of the collections — for instance,
the capacity to extract information about depth from paired retinal arrays, or
to resolve binocular rivalry.
Counting two token senses agrees with Grice. As described, however, I dis-
agree with Grice’s other verdict. Each distinct token is a sense of vision, rather
than some other distinct kind of sense. Each instantiates the same determinate
collection of perceptual capacities, exercised in the same manner. According
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to the capacities account I have presented, a mere phenomenological differ-
ence does not by itself suffice for possessing senses of different types (cf.
Ross, 2001). Thus, the four-eyed creatures possess a second sense of vision,
where typical humans have one.
Alternatively, suppose Grice’s creatures can perceive distinct sorts of things
and features using each pair of eyes. If differences in phenomenal character
require differences in what seems to be perceived, Grice’s claim that the phe-
nomenology differs requires this description. If so, they do not deploy the same
set of perceptual capacities using each. Thus, they possess at least one novel
determinate sense.
However, this does not imply that one sense is not visual, since the capaci-
ties associated with each sense may be deployed in the same sort of manner. If,
as Grice maintains, the organ is an eye-like structure that enables perception
by extracting information from the light, then each rightly counts as a visual
sense.
In either description, Grice’s four-eyed creature has two distinct token vi-
sual senses. This case illustrates why it is important to distinguish token,
determinate, and determinable senses.
6.2. Smell, Taste, and Flavor
Smell and taste rely on extracting chemical information. Therefore, according
to the account described here, each belongs to a single determinable type of
chemical sensory modality. However, human smell and taste are distinct deter-
minate senses. Each is a distinct collection of perceptual capacities, employed
in a distinctive sensory manner.
Gustation serves to disclose the nutritive value of substances we ingest.
It relies on the use of our tongues, taking advantage of taste buds’ capacity
to transduce and thus to enable extraction of information about sweetness,
sourness, saltiness, bitterness, and umami from soluble molecules and ions.
Olfaction plays a different role. It reveals attractive and repellent aspects of our
surroundings by means of musky, pungent, putrid, minty, camphor, or floral
odors. It relies on sensitivity to a dizzying range of airborne, volatile chemical
compounds that make their way into our noses. This vector does not require
direct contact with the source. Thus, smell and taste are distinct bundles of
perceptual capacities, exercised by means of differing types of sensory infor-
mation gathering. Each involves a distinct information extraction function. So,
smell and taste are distinct determinate senses that belong to a common deter-
minable.
Sometimes it is suggested that flavor perception is a novel modality dis-
tinct from taste and smell (Macpherson, 2011; Matthen, 2015). According to
the capacities approach, flavor perception need not be regarded as the work
of a new sense modality. While it involves perceiving a novel feature type,
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and thus a new perceptual capacity, it does not implicate a wholly novel sen-
sory manner distinct from those that mark taste and smell. Perceiving flavors,
such as the mintiness of mint ice cream, is not a sui generis sensory way of
exercising perceptual capacities. Savoring a wine’s flavor deploys no distinct
manipulable sense organ beyond the tongue, the mouth, and the nose. It ex-
ploits no new form of sensory transduction, and it relies only on information
extracted through other means. Flavor perception makes use of multiple sense
organs, the coordinated use of several sensory systems, and perceptual capac-
ities jointly exercised in differing sensory manners. So, flavor perception is a
multisensory perceptual capacity.
Smell and taste illustrate why it is important that distinct determinate
senses, comprising distinct perceptual capacities, may rely on extracting in-
formation from the same type of medium. Flavor shows why novel perceptual
capacities do not require novel sensory modalities.
6.3. Touch
Touch is tricky. Touch includes distinct determinable types of senses. Common
usage recognizes a lot of variety, including active, passive, and affective touch.
Focus on haptic touch. This means tactually discerning things and attributes
independent from oneself, through contact, by means of forces, vibrations, and
motion.
Even haptic touch is a difficult case. Active touch involves several receptor
types and distinct pathways for stimulation of each kind, including mechani-
cal forces, heat, and chemical irritation. For instance, human skin houses four
types of mechanoreceptors, used to discern form, roughness, stretch, slip, and
vibration. Thermoreception relies on distinct receptors for warming and cool-
ing. All of these receptors are distributed over the body, rather than in some
local cluster.
Mechanical and thermal touch rely on differing ways to exercise a percep-
tual capacity. Mechanoreception extracts information from mechanical forces,
while thermoreception extracts information from heat. Distinct kinds of energy
suffice for distinct sorts of information extraction function. Thus, according to
this paper’s account, mechanical and thermal touch belong to distinct deter-
minable types of sensory modality.
Determinates of haptic mechanoreception include senses that comprise ca-
pacities to discern extended objects, substances, and their size, shape, texture,
hardness, force, and movement (see de Vignemont and Massin, 2015). Ther-
moreception, however, requires capacities that can be exercised by means of
an activity or process that functions to extract information from patterns of
thermal transfer, such as sensitivity to hot and cold (for helpful refinement,
see Gray, 2013).
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Touch is a hard case because all of its recognized forms involve perceptual
capacities exercised through skin contact. It lacks a well-defined sense organ,
and its receptors are comingled. Both mechanoreception and thermoreception
target features of things that touch the body, and they make use of observably
similar patterns of movement and exploration. Moreover, haptic and thermal
features often are bound to a common tangible object. So, the activities and
targets suggest a single sense.
Nonetheless, distinct ways of perceiving can target common objects, and
feature binding can occur across senses (O’Callaghan, 2014; cf. Fulkerson,
2014b). The kinds of activities required to do so reflect close coordination be-
tween senses, rather than the work of one sense. Still, haptic and thermal touch
are not just superficially similar. At least in humans, their aims are closely
aligned.
The affinities between haptic and thermal touch disguise the deeper dif-
ference. According to the capacities account I have described, thermal touch
is a distinct determinable sense from haptic touch not just because it does
not reveal the same type of feature, but because it extracts information from
the environment in such a dissimilar manner. Touch therefore shows that how
many senses we count can be revised in light of empirical discoveries, back-
ground theoretical considerations, and appreciating multisensory perception.
Our perceptual capacities and the manners in which we exercise them are open
to scientific and philosophical illumination.
Haptic and thermal touch illustrate that distinct perceptual capacities exer-
cised by means of superficially similar activities nevertheless may belong to
distinct determinable senses. The capacities account captures this by invoking
a distinct type of information extraction function for each of the respective
activities.
6.4. Sensory Substitution
Sensory substitution devices enable distinct determinate forms of perception
that employ familiar human senses. One technique bypasses a natural sense
organ with a device that stimulates another. Tactile visual sensory substitution
(TVSS) is a familiar example (Bach-y-Rita, 1967). It uses a head-mounted
camera attached to a vibrotactile array that stimulates the skin. Over time,
this enables subjects to discern objects, shapes, position, and motion at a dis-
tance in a way similar to vision. Another system, the vOICe, uses cameras to
transcode information about a visible scene into sound.
One central question about sensory substitution is whether it enables per-
ception associated with the substituted sensory modality. For instance, does
TVSS make seeing possible? In this paper’s account, it is plausible that TVSS
enables a form of vision. Using TVSS, subjects exercise typical visual capac-
ities in a manner sufficient for seeing.
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The TVSS device has a head-mounted camera used by its wearer to explore
and investigate the facing scene. Practiced subjects can detect and differenti-
ate objects and spatial features at a distance. They employ the device like eyes
to gather information, taking advantage of its photoreceptors and their capac-
ity to transduce light. This enables information about distant features that is
encoded in the light to be extracted. The activity serves that role. Its informa-
tion extraction function is visual, as individuated by the sort of information
it serves to extract and the medium from which it does so. TVSS enables its
users to perceive in a visual manner. It is impoverished compared with typical
human vision, but TVSS users have a determinate sense of vision.
Nevertheless, TVSS is distinctive because it implicates the sense of touch
(the vOICe implicates audition). Perception using TVSS relies on mechanore-
ceptors, and it exploits their capacity to transduce information from vibrations.
But it does not involve the body and the skin in the exploratory patterns
characteristic of haptic touch. Moreover, it extracts a very different variety
of information from what vibrations typically encode. And it does not man-
ifest the customary haptic capacities to detect and differentiate attributes of
extended objects and substances that make contact with the body. Thus, in its
fluent use, the capacities on display and the information-gathering activity by
means of which they are exercised differ from those of touch. TVSS therefore
recruits an intact sense of touch to replace typical human vision. According
to the capacities account I have described, accomplished TVSS users have an
atypical determinate form of vision whose employment makes use of the organ
of touch.
Sensory substitution illustrates that possessing a certain type of sense
modality does not rely on the usual biology. According to the capacities
account I have described, what matters is having the relevant perceptual ca-
pacities and being able to exercise them by means of an activity that serves to
extract the needed information from a specific medium.
6.5. Augmentation
Sensory augmentation uses technology to extend sense perception. Actual
forms supplement existing token senses to add to their capacities. For instance,
you might be fit with a device, such as a cochlear implant, to detect frequencies
outside your current range, or above human range. This alters your determi-
nate sense of hearing by adding to your auditory perceptual capacities, or to
the typical human stock.
Hypothetical forms promise a wholly new way of perceiving. You might
acquire a magnetic sense that enables you to perceive orientation with respect
to Earth’s polar magnetic field, enhancing your navigation skills (Note 7). This
would secure a way of exercising perceptual capacities most humans lack.
David Eagleman provocatively suggests we might develop a weather sense, a
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stock market sense, or a Twitter sense if hooked up to the relevant data feed.
This raises challenging questions about the limits of sensory augmentation that
are beyond this paper’s scope. Nonetheless, the capacities account shows what
is at stake (Note 8).
Sensory augmentation illustrates that a determinate sense may be extended
to encompass additional capacities, by enabling a perceiver to extract further
information from a medium, and that new determinable senses could stem
from having means to extract information from a wholly novel source.
6.6. Alien Senses
Non-human senses can be familiar or unfamiliar. Bunnies discern frequency
and localize sounds far better than we do. Honeybees detect ultraviolet light.
Bunnies and bees have capacities humans lack, but they still hear and see.
Since they gather information about similar things and features from the same
type of medium, familiar senses of non-human animals are distinct determi-
nates of determinable senses humans possess.
Other senses are alien to us. A shark’s capacity to navigate and find prey
using magnetic and electrical fields reveals a novel electromagnetic sense. The
distinctive way sharks perceive is an unfamiliar determinable type of sense.
Its determinate forms are fixed by the capacities they exercise in that foreign
electromagnetically sensitive manner. Extraterrestrial aliens could have senses
of a sort wholly novel to Earth. Such senses require wholly alien ways or
manners of perceiving.
What about echolocating bats and dolphins? According to the capacities
approach, each has a sense of hearing, comprising auditory perceptual capac-
ities. But the determinate collections of auditory capacities bats and dolphins
possess are in certain respects far more extensive (and overlap more with vi-
sion), while the information-gathering activities by which they wield them are
more interactive (like using a flashlight), when compared with typical human
hearing.
Alien senses of non-human creatures illustrate that it is important to dis-
tinguish distinctive determinate senses of a familiar determinable form from
wholly novel determinable senses.
6.7. Synopsis
According to the capacities account, a sense is a bundle of perceptual capaci-
ties. Each distinct bundle shares a common sensory manner. A sensory manner
is a sort of information gathering activity. As developed here, each such activ-
ity type is marked by the information it serves to extract from a given medium.
This approach to the senses is realist. Sense individuation turns on genuine
physical and psychological commonalities and differences, not just pragmatic
interests. It answers to the perceptual capacities a perceiver possesses and to
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the distinctive ways in which those capacities are exercised. It offers a univocal
way to differentiate distinct token, determinate, or determinable senses.
It is a strength of the capacities approach I have described that it provides
resources to characterize and help resolve key hard cases. And it offers defen-
sible verdicts.
7. Multisensory Perception
How does this approach handle multisensory perception and consciousness?
Understanding distinct senses as capacities organized by the manners in which
they are exercised offers taxonomic payoff in characterizing multisensory phe-
nomena.
In the first place, the account illuminates what makes a perceptual capacity
unisensory or multisensory. Start with sensible features. A proper sensible is
a feature accessible with just one sense. Accordingly, it is a feature targeted
by a perceptual capacity that can be deployed in only one sensory manner.
For instance, for typical humans, pitch is perceptible only by means of an
information-gathering activity that functions to extract information about dis-
tal events and features encoded in sound waves. This approach allows for
multiple proper sensibles of one sense. These are distinct proper sensibles ac-
cessible in a common sensory manner, none of which is perceptible by means
of any other sense.
A common sensible is accessible with multiple senses. It is a feature tar-
geted by a perceptual capacity that can be deployed in more than one sensory
manner. For instance, shape and motion are perceptible not only through
an activity type that involves the use of the eyes but also though a type of
activity that implicates the skin and mechanoreception. Each has a distinct
information-gathering function, corresponding to the extraction of informa-
tion from light and from mechanical forces, respectively.
Ascribing a perceptual capacity for the purpose of predicting and explaining
performance involves specifying what is accomplished, in what conditions,
and in which manner. The senses are bundles of capacities individuated by a
common way or manner of perceiving. This enables us to characterize what
makes a perceptual capacity unisensory, unimodal, or multisensory.
Say that a unisensory, or sense-specific, perceptual capacity is one that can
be exercised in only one sensory manner. For instance, there is only one rele-
vant sort of manner in which one can detect and differentiate a proper sensible,
such as pitch. However, unisensory capacities need not be limited to those tar-
geting proper sensibles. Multiple object tracking, for example, is unisensory if
it is only exercised visually.
A unimodal capacity, as I understand it, is one for which an exercise can
occur in a single manner. By this I mean that, like a unisensory capacity, one
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sensory manner exists per token exercise; however, in contrast with a unisen-
sory or sense-specific capacity, a unimodal capacity can be deployed in distinct
ways. Thus, a unimodal capacity may belong to multiple senses. For example,
the capacity to perceive a common sensible, such as texture, may be deployed
separately in vision and in touch (Note 9).
Turn now to forms of perception that involve multiple senses. A multi-
sensory capacity, in this choice of terminology, is one that can be deployed
multisensorily, or in a way that relies on more than one sensory manner. A
capacity that can be exercised using one sense at a time nonetheless may also
be exercised in a way that jointly employs more than one sensory manner.
This is the case when a subject perceptually identifies an object or feature
discerned using distinct senses, or when a subject is perceptually sensitive to
an intermodal spatial, temporal, or causal relation. For example, you can per-
ceive identity, space, time, and causality with just one sense, but you also can
perceive novel intermodal instances of such features by using several senses
in coordination. These are critical cases that have been used to diagnose gen-
uinely multisensory capacities because they rely on the joint use of multiple
senses.
A novel, or distinctive, multisensory capacity is one that cannot be exercised
originally using one sense at a time, or by means of a single sensory manner.
Flavor and balance perception are examples. Flavor and balance are accessi-
ble only multisensorily. Perceiving such novel features relies on the joint use
of multiple senses. Each relies on information extracted from several distinct
sources. Each is distinctively, ineliminably multisensory.
Therefore, according to the capacities account of the senses, possessing
multisensory perceptual capacities is compatible with having genuinely dis-
tinct senses. What is more, in this account, multisensory capacities require
distinct senses. That is because multisensory capacities require for their ex-
ercise multiple ways or manners of sensory information gathering, engaged
jointly. That is, they rely on activities of distinct types that function in dif-
ferent ways to enable us to extract information about distal features from a
medium. Such complex activities serve to extend our perceptual capacities.
This account has two noteworthy consequences. The first is that the senses
are not exclusive. It is possible for a perceptual capacity to belong to more than
one token, determinate, or determinable sense. For instance, the capacity to de-
tect and differentiate motion is part of human vision and audition. The second
is that the senses are not exhaustive. By this I mean that not every perceptual
capacity must belong to some individual sensory modality or another. Some
novel perceptual capacities require for their exercise the joint use of several
senses. Possessing such a capacity relies on coordination among senses.
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8. Experiences
What about perceptual experiences? Senses are bundles of perceptual capac-
ities. Experiences are not capacities. In virtue of what do perceptual experi-
ences belong to sensory modalities? Multisensory phenomena have been said
to pose special trouble here (Speaks, 2015; Tye, 2003). How do we pry apart
experiences that constitutively involve multiple senses?
The capacities account enables us to ascribe perceptual episodes to sensory
modalities. And it does so in a way that is compatible with richly multisensory
perception and consciousness.
Perceptual episodes are events or occurrences that involve the exercise of
one or more perceptual capacities. Perceptual experiences are phenomenally
conscious perceptual episodes. They are perceptual episodes in which a sub-
ject instantiates phenomenal character.
Exercising a perceptual capacity requires doing so in some way or manner.
Therefore, perceptual episodes belong to types corresponding to the manners
in which subjects manifest perceptual capacities. For instance, an episode is
auditory just in case it involves exercising capacities in the manner charac-
teristic of audition — that is, by means of an information-gathering activity
with the function to extract from pressure waves information about features
such as sounds, pitch, timbre, loudness, duration, and location. Manner, and
thus modality, is an attribute or aspect of a perceptual episode. This provides
a scheme for attributing experiences to sensory modalities. Accordingly, a
typical human subject perceives auditorily, visually, tactually, olfactorily, or
gustatorily.
Multisensory perception is no special obstacle. Most perceptual episodes
involve exercising perceptual capacities in several sensory manners. Each such
episode belongs to several sensory modalities. For instance, watching a movie
typically involves episodes that are both visual and auditory. The noteworthy
consequence is that, like the senses themselves, the modalities of a percep-
tual episode are not exclusive. Belonging to one sensory modality does not
preclude belonging to another. Being visual does not rule out being auditory.
Here, there is a taxonomic payoff in characterizing perceptual episodes.
A unisensory episode involves the exercise of perceptual capacities in just one
sensory manner. Touching a rough surface in darkness and silence may be
an example. A multisensory episode is one in which perceptual capacities are
deployed in more than one sensory manner.
It is theoretically fruitful to add a further distinction. A minimally multi-
sensory episode is one that involves the exercise of perceptual capacities in
more than one sensory manner but in which each of the capacities exercised
is unimodal, relying on no more than one sensory manner. On the other hand,
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a richly multisensory episode involves deploying a multisensory capacity and
relying for its exercise on more than one sensory manner.
What about parts of perceptual episodes or experiences? It is common to say
that perceptual experiences comprise co-conscious components of the various
sensory modalities. This may be used to justify focusing on a single sense,
such as vision alone (see, for example, Siegel 2010, pp. 19–21). However,
if experiences are conscious episodes, then experiences are events. As such,
experiences need not apportion neatly into parts, each of which itself is a con-
scious episode that belongs to a single modality (Tye, 2003, ch. 1).
My view is that we should forget about carving up perceptual episodes and
analyzing them in terms of individual sense-specific parts. Nevertheless, it is
intuitive to think that seeing a cardinal is a proper part of my current conscious
experience. We can address the intuition by saying what it is for features, in-
cluding phenomenal features, to be associated with a given sense modality
on an occasion. The features of a particular episode that are associated with
a given sensory modality include just those that a corresponding unimodal
episode could have under equivalent stimulation, where a unimodal episode is
one that belongs to a given sensory modality but that does not belong to any
other sensory modality. For illustration, suppose that right now you are having
a complex multisensory experience. The features of your current experience
that are associated with vision include just those that a corresponding unisen-
sory visual experience — one that is visual but not auditory, tactual, gustatory,
or olfactory — would have under equivalent sensory stimulation. And so on
for each sense. So, we can say that a feature, such as a phenomenal character
instantiated in consciously perceiving scarlet, is associated with vision, while
denying that conscious episodes decompose to yield a neat visual part.
This has a further taxonomic payoff. A minimally multisensory experience
is innocuous. It is a conscious episode whose features are exhausted by those
associated with each of the respective sensory modalities, plus those that ac-
crue thanks to mere co-consciousness. A richly multisensory experience is
more interesting. It is a conscious episode whose features are not exhausted
by those associated with each of the respective senses, plus those that accrue
thanks to mere co-consciousness. Consciously perceiving a novel intermodal
feature, such as identity, simultaneity, causality, or flavor, is an example of a
richly multisensory perceptual experience.
This leads to a final significant consequence. The approach I have described
does not require that every feature of a perceptual episode, including its phe-
nomenal features, on each occasion must be associated with some sensory
modality or another. The senses are not exhaustive in this way. Accordingly,
not all phenomenal character is sense-specific, even allowing for whatever
stems from simple unity of consciousness. This approach therefore enables us
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to reject the exhaustiveness of the senses, understood as experiential modali-
ties.
The capacities approach to characterizing and differentiating the senses thus
accommodates even richly multisensory forms of perception and conscious-
ness. Multisensory perception and consciousness are compatible with distin-
guishing distinct senses, attributing perceptual episodes to sensory modalities,
and associating features of episodes with specific senses. The key is to reject
the exclusiveness and exhaustiveness of the senses. When we take the right
approach to individuating the senses, multisensory phenomena do not pose
trouble for the project of differentiating distinct senses. In fact, a proper under-
standing of the senses illuminates the nature and the purpose of multisensory
phenomena.
9. The Significance of the Senses
Nudds (2003) says that an account of the senses should address their signifi-
cance. What explanatory gain stems from distinguishing distinct senses? With
the capacities approach now in view, let us revisit why it is valuable to dif-
ferentiate distinct senses. Why does it matter that we possess distinct senses
rather than just a long list of perceptual capacities? The account I have de-
scribed captures six reasons why distinct senses matter.
First, there are vastly different ways to exercise the same perceptual capac-
ity and noteworthy similarities in how subjects exercise distinct capacities. An
account that explains why has advantages in economy and generality. Sensory
manners capture important aspects of the grain of the sensory landscape.
Second, each sense reveals a certain range of features that serves a per-
ceiver’s specific needs. Each sensory manner enables perceivers to extract
the requisite information. For example, if you want to find ripe tomatoes on
tangled vines, exploring with your eyes to extract information about colors,
shapes, and extended objects from the light is a good strategy. On the other
hand, to find your lost phone, it is better to call it and use your ears, taking
advantage of their capacity to transduce and thus enable information about
spatial location to be extracted from pressure waves. Taste and smell serve
a host of critical needs concerning nutrition and harm avoidance by means
of their chemical sensitivities. The account described explains how differing
forms of sense perception enable creatures to meet differing kinds of needs.
Third, multiple ways of perceiving can enhance your epistemic position.
Using different ways of gathering information expands your view, and it gives
you another angle. It provides information about new things and features, and
it offers further information about things and features perceived in other ways.
Making use of multiple information sources thus helps you to be not just more
comprehensive but also more accurate and more reliable. Sense perception
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works better with multiple ways of exercising perceptual capacities. This can
accrue to your epistemic standing.
Fourth, just as possessing multiple senses has practical benefits, being able
to exercise perceptual capacities in multiple ways proves useful. For instance,
redundancy improves resilience. Distinct sorts of information gathering can
target the same things and features. So, a perceiver can still function without
one or more ways of exercising perceptual capacities. Flexibility also helps. In
planning and acting, it is good to be able to mine several information sources.
Fifth, according to this account, distinct senses provide valuable third-
person information about what and how someone else has perceived. For
example, if I tell you that Edith has seen the Rubik’s Cube, rather than just
that she has perceived it, then you are in a position to know what other sorts
of features she is likely to have perceived, such as its pattern of colored stick-
ers, and also why she perceived those features rather than its weight or its
characteristic tchking sound. This in turn enables you to attribute to Edith cor-
responding experiences and beliefs, and it gives you good reasons for doing
so.
Sixth, distinct sensory manners can be employed jointly, rather than inde-
pendently and in parallel, to extend one’s perceptual capacities. Employing
distinct information-gathering activities in coordination is a novel, complex
form of activity. It enables the exercise of perceptual capacities that otherwise
could be deployed only separately. It does so because it enables perceivers to
extract information about features that are encoded jointly by distinct sources.
Subjects thereby can detect and differentiate novel intermodal instances of fea-
tures such as rhythm and causality and novel types of features such as flavors
and balance. The capacities account thus explains why sense perception can
do more when distinct ways of perceiving are used in coordination.
The capacities approach therefore is able to capture and elucidate the sig-
nificance of the senses.
10. Conclusions
According to the account described, senses are families of perceptual capaci-
ties. These include capacities to detect and differentiate things and features in
one’s environment. Senses are differentiated by a distinctive way or manner of
exercising perceptual capacities. Sensory manners are information-gathering
activity types. Each is individuated by an information extraction function,
determined by the sort of information the activity serves to extract and the
medium from which it does so.
Sensorily perceiving involves exercising perceptual capacities in some such
manner. Perceptual episodes belong to types that correspond to the manners
in which perceptual capacities are exercised. It is important that such types
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are not exclusive. Attributing an episode to one sensory modality does not
preclude attributing it to another.
Experiences are phenomenally conscious episodes. They are episodes in
which a subject instantiates a phenomenal character. Experiences may be as-
cribed to sensory modalities according to the manners in which perceptual
capacities are exercised. According to this account, phenomenal features do
not play an essential role in individuating senses or in attributing experiences
to sensory modalities. Modality is not a fundamental determinant of phenom-
enal character. Modality is not an experientially basic category.
Boundaries between senses thus need not be evident just in examining phe-
nomenology. Subjects may have only limited knowledge of the senses with
which they perceive on any occasion. Moreover, not every feature of a per-
ceptual episode, including its phenomenal features, must be associated with
one sense or another. In this respect, not all perceptual experience is modality-
specific. Individual senses are not exhaustive.
According to this account, perceptual processes associated with distinct
senses can interact extensively, and some perceptual capacities may require
coordination and cooperation among senses. Moreover, some forms of percep-
tual consciousness may be constitutively and ineliminably multisensory. So, it
comports with the science and the philosophy of multisensory perception and
consciousness.
This framework distinguishes the project of characterizing and differenti-
ating senses from that of attributing perceptual episodes and experiences to
sense modalities. It provides a principled, informative account of the senses
according to which typical human subjects and other creatures possess mul-
tiple senses, and it is compatible with richly multisensory perception and
consciousness. Multisensory perception and consciousness do not challenge
the distinctness of our senses, but we ought to reject their independence.
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Notes
1. Fodor (1983) does not treat senses as wholly modular, in light of cross-
modal phenomena such as the McGurk effect (see, especially, p. 47 and
footnote 13). Instead, Fodor’s domain-specific modules may span senses.
2. Multisensory cases play a key role in Grice’s remarks. His central argu-
ment concerns a crossmodal conflict, in which sight and touch disagree
about whether two coins have equal size (p. 137ff.). Grice even advances
as a relevant consideration a hypothetical description of an empirically
possible crossmodal interaction (pp. 139–140).
3. A number of more specific criteria have been proposed. (i) Aristotle (De
Anima II.vi–x) famously distinguishes senses by proper or special sen-
sibles — colors, sounds, tastes, smells, warmth, and pressure (Barnes,
1984). (ii) Grice (1962) appeals to the full range of features revealed
by each of the respective senses. (iii) Heil (1983, ch. 1) relies on kinds
of physical stimulation to sensory receptors and types of energy trans-
duced — light, sound, heat, chemical, and mechanical. (iv) Keeley (2002)
invokes evolutionarily dedicated sense organs. (v) Psychologists and neu-
roscientists delineate senses according to functionally or physiologically
distinct systems responsible for sensory processing. (vi) Representation-
alists often appeal to differing contents associated with various senses.
(vii) Clark (1993) and Rosenthal (2015) rely on quality spaces determined
by patterns of discrimination distinctive to each sense. (viii) Peacocke
(1983), Lopes (2000), and, ultimately, Grice (1962) himself, cite distinc-
tive experiential character associated with each of the senses. While a
full survey and assessment is beyond this paper’s scope, as Nudds (2003)
makes evident, each more specific criterion faces difficulties familiar from
discussions of Grice’s original four criteria.
4. To be clear, distinct ranges of individuals or feature instances that a subject
can detect and differentiate suffice for distinct capacities. I am not suggest-
ing that each distinct particular individual or feature instance guarantees a
distinct perceptual capacity.
5. Cummins’s approach serves as an important precursor to the mechanistic
explanation movement (Machamer et al., 2000). A mechanistic explana-
tion is an even more specific description of the way or manner in which a
capacity is exercised.
6. What Macpherson (2011) labels “token senses” are determinate senses in
my accounting, rather than token senses.
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7. Maybe you would not need a new sense organ. Wang et al. (2019) report
electroencephalographic (EEG) evidence (alpha-event-related desynchro-
nization) that human brains are differentially sensitive to the local orienta-
tion of Earth’s magnetic field.
8. “Can we create new senses for humans?” (TED talk, March 2015, avail-
able at https://youtu.be/4c1lqFXHvqI). It would be challenging to im-
plement appropriate information-gathering activities and processes that
served to extract such information and thus to enable the exercise of cor-
responding perceptual capacities that become integrated in our existing
perceptual repertoire. Thus, it would be a surprise for Eagleman’s exam-
ples to qualify as genuine modalities of sense perception.
9. It is more common to label such capacities amodal. However, this elides
the distinction between a capacity that can be exercised in distinct sensory
manners and a capacity that cannot be exercised in any specific sensory
manner. ‘Amodal’ may be reserved for capacities of the latter type.
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